Government Files is The Canada Report's public-records analysis series examining government documents obtained through Canada's Access to Information (ATI) and provincial Freedom of Information (FOI) laws. These transparency laws allow members of the public to request internal government records from federal and provincial institutions. This article reviews documents released through those processes and summarizes what the records contain and what they show. While we strive for accuracy, this article represents an analysis and interpretation of the source material. For complete accuracy and full context, readers should review the original documents, which are available in full below.
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The Royal Canadian Air Force believes it can rebuild its pilot ranks to full strength by 2029 — with one stubborn exception. Internal briefings prepared for the Commander of the RCAF identify fighter pilots as the single outlier the air force has not figured out how to keep, with captain-rank fighter pilots leaving at roughly double the rate of pilots across the rest of the fleet and fighter vacancies at that rank running at double the next-worst aircraft community. One slide states plainly that pay incentives and new flight suits, two measures the air force had leaned on, did not have the desired effect on fighter captains.
The findings come from a May 2025 briefing titled "Pilot Absorption and Production," together with a March 2025 "Future Structure Plan" submission, both released to The Canada Report under Access to Information request A-2025-00523 by the Department of National Defence. The pilot-production deck was prepared for, and its decision pages signed by, Lieutenant-General Eric Kenny, the Commander of the RCAF.
What the Documents Show
The central message of the pilot briefing is cautiously optimistic. The air force measures its health against a target called Trained Effective Strength, and the records say the RCAF's long-range planning model now shows current production is sufficient to reach 100 percent trained strength by 1 April 2029. That is a meaningful turnaround from the backlog years that followed the pandemic.
But reaching that target carries a caveat the briefing returns to repeatedly: it assumes the air force can shave its captain pilot attrition rate from 5.0 percent a year down to 4.8 percent. That sounds trivial. The records frame it as retaining roughly two extra captain-rank pilots per year — the difference, on paper, between hitting the 2029 target and missing it. The model, in other words, has almost no slack.
The fighter force is where that slack disappears. A slide breaking down captain release rates by community shows fighter captains leaving the Forces at about twice the rate of captains across all pilot trades, a gap the briefing flags as an "outlier." A separate table on filled positions and attrition notes that the shortage of captains in the fighter force is "double" that of the next-closest fleet. The actual fighter-specific numbers in both tables are blacked out, but the surrounding narrative makes the scale of the problem clear.
Perhaps the most striking single line in the package is the air force's own assessment of what it has already tried. Under a recommendation to target fighter captains for reduced attrition, the briefing notes that neither pay nor flight suits had the desired effect on this group. Both were retention levers the Canadian Armed Forces has publicly discussed — and the RCAF's internal read is that, for the pilots who fly its frontline jets, they have not moved the needle.
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Why This Lands as Canada Moves to the F-35
The timing matters because of what the fighter fleet is about to become. The briefing's backup slides discuss expanding overseas training to build up Canada's pilot pipeline, and one notes that training delays "will grow for Ftr when CF18 OTU closes" — a reference to the eventual shutdown of the operational training unit for the legacy CF-18 Hornet. Another slide describes a workaround that would "increase pool ready for CF35 OTU," using the RCAF's internal shorthand for the F-35.
In plain terms, the air force is trying to keep a steady supply of fighter pilots flowing precisely as it switches the aircraft those pilots train and fly on. Canada has committed to acquiring F-35s to replace its aging Hornets, and the political and procurement debate around that purchase has been running for years. The pilot-production records add a personnel dimension that gets less public attention: a new jet is only as useful as the trained, retained aircrew available to fly it, and the records identify retaining fighter captains as the part of that equation the RCAF has not solved. Readers following the procurement side of this story may find useful context in our earlier coverage of Canada's F-35 fighter jet review and the debate it sparked.
A Training Pipeline in Transition
Beyond fighters, the briefing paints a picture of an air force juggling several training transitions at once. Pilot training wait times have improved at the front end — the records show the wait to start Phase 1 dropping from 3.3 months in August 2024 to 2.0 months by April 2025, which the briefing attributes to a deliberate reduction in the number of unskilled candidates brought in. Phase 3, the advanced stage, remained backed up, with wait times sitting around eight months and the briefing pointing to a "COVID bubble" of trainees still working through the system.
The air force also flagged a structural change to how it produces pilots. It recommended ending the long-running NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC) contract without exercising its option year, ceasing production at the contract's 2027 end date, and using the wind-down period to stand up its replacement — the Future Aircrew Training (FAcT) programme — in Moose Jaw. The briefing warns of "orphan" students who would not finish their courses before the old contract expires unless arrangements are extended, and of a possible gap between the two systems where Canada might need an overseas training solution if FAcT is not online in time.
Those overseas options are spelled out in detail. The records describe arrangements explored with the United States Navy, the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force, and partner-nation programmes, and they put dollar figures on the American option: roughly US$273,000 per multi-engine graduate, US$399,000 per fighter-stream graduate, and US$246,000 per air combat systems officer graduate. The briefing's broader theme of fleets straining to absorb and produce aircrew during a modernization push echoes our reporting on how the RCAF is overhauling its fleets amid personnel shortages over a decade-long transformation.
What's Missing from the Records
This release is notable as much for what is withheld as for what it shows. The most direct fighter-specific figures — the precise attrition and vacancy numbers for the fighter force, and the air force's production and intake targets broken down by stream — are redacted under section 15(1) of the Access to Information Act, the exemption covering information that could injure national defence.
Two of the briefing's recommendations are blacked out entirely. On the decision pages signed by the Commander RCAF, the lists of pilot-production decisions and follow-on tasks each contain a numbered item left blank, withheld under section 69(1)(g) — the exemption protecting Cabinet confidences. So while the records confirm that fighter retention is the air force's top pilot concern and that pay and flight suits have fallen short, the specific measure the RCAF is recommending to fix it is precisely the piece the public does not get to see.
The companion Future Structure Plan submission is a separate, broader document — a 20-year personnel growth plan tied largely to continental-defence and NORAD-modernization commitments rather than to fighter pilots specifically. It is worth one note: the plan books a net reduction of 230 positions against the FAcT training programme even as the RCAF projects growth of more than 5,400 positions overall, a reminder that the training enterprise is being reshaped at the same time the air force is trying to grow.
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Support Government FilesAll figures and statements referenced are from the Department of National Defence briefings "Pilot Absorption and Production" (May 2025) and "RCAF Submission to the Future Structure Plan" (March 2025), released under Access to Information request A-2025-00523. The records were prepared for the Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force and contain redactions applied under sections 15(1) and 69(1)(g) of the Access to Information Act.
